Abstract. This paper proposes a model for assessing the risk posed by natural hazards to infrastructures. The model prescribes 5 a three level analysis with increasing level of detail, moving from qualitative to quantitative analysis. The focus is on a methodology for semi-quantitative analysis to be performed at the second level. The purpose of this type of analysis is to 
1.
What are the threats and hazards of relevance that the infrastructures under consideration might be exposed to? (Danger identification) 2. How often does, or how likely is it for an adverse event to occur? (estimation of likelihood of occurrence; hazard)
3.
What can go wrong? (Evaluation of sensitivity (susceptibility) and resilience, resulting cascades and consequences) 25
4.
How bad are the consequences? (Assessment of severity of consequences and risk, identification of high consequence scenarios)
After the risk assessment is carried out, the final questions are: "What should be done? What are the obvious and non-obvious vulnerabilities and how can they be reduced and/or better managed?". This question requires a discussion about acceptability/tolerability of risk and the potential mitigation measures, cost/benefit assessment, prioritisation and urgency. 30
In order to target the scope of the risk assessment, it is favourable to perform analyses at different levels, starting with a coarse analysis and subsequently increase the degree of detail. The coarsest analyses are usually done by subjective assessments and considerable use of expert judgment. For such analyses broad expertise is essential to ensure satisfactory quality of the analysis Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess-2016 Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess- -89, 2016 Manuscript under review for journal Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. results, otherwise the assessment may be too coarse, important events may be overlooked and the results of the assessment too subjective. On the other hand, detailed quantitative analyses are often too complex and time-consuming to be applied as a tool to identify the most critical risk scenarios. An alternative tool for screening of the potential scenarios in a systematic, transparent and repeatable way could bridge this gap. This paper propose an explicit methodology applicable for such screening. 5
Scope
The aim of the work in this paper is to propose a comprehensive and user-friendly method for identification and assessment of natural events/natural hazards leading to malfunctioning of infrastructure. The method is designed to be consistent with, and a supplement to, the guidelines for municipal risk and vulnerability analysis in Norway, provided by the Norwegian directorate for Civil Protection, DSB (2014) . The proposed method aims to be applicable within the main infrastructures (electricity 10 supply, water supply, transportation, and ICT) and to provide support for mapping of threats from natural events, for planning and preparedness and for prioritization of risk reduction measures. Strategies for risk reduction fall into two types: those that minimise the probability of infrastructure failure, and those that minimise the negative effects of a failure, (IRGC, 2007) . The proposed method takes into account the vulnerabilities of infrastructure and barriers that affect the probability of infrastructure failure. It also considers factors affecting the social consequences of malfunctioning of the infrastructure. The scope is 15 schematically illustrated in Figure 1 . Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess-2016 Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess- -89, 2016 Manuscript under review for journal Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Published: 11 April 2016 c Author(s) 2016. CC-BY 3.0 License.
Background
By law, the Norwegian municipalities are required to carry out a risk and vulnerability analysis and plan and prepare for emergencies in a short-and long-term perspective. The purpose with the duty/legislation is to ensure that the municipalities are working holistically and systematically with societal safety and preparedness across sectors in the municipality. Knowledge about risk and vulnerability is important to reduce the probability of undesirable events and to reduce the consequences should 5 the event occur. The current format of the municipal risk and vulnerability assessments is very similar to a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) where the starting point is the identification of undesired events, followed by a simple probability and consequence assessment of each event. Through the work with the risk and vulnerability analysis, the municipality obtains a better overview over, and an increased consciousness about, the relevant risks and vulnerabilities. In addition, the municipality can acquire knowledge about how risks and vulnerabilities can be managed. The ultimate goal of the analyses is to ensure the 10 safety of the inhabitants. This goal is further specified through four societal values with corresponding consequence types as shown in Table 1 .
Vulnerability analysis of the infrastructures and their interdependencies is an essential part of the municipal risk and vulnerability analysis for the societal value named "Stability", i.e. the consequences like "Lack of basic provisions" and "Disruptions in daily life". 15
A literature review on vulnerability assessment of critical infrastructure and on losses caused by adverse weather and natural hazards has been conducted in this study. Infrastructures have some basic traits in common, such as large-size, wide-area coverage, complexity and interconnectedness, but show significant differences in detail. Methods for vulnerability assessment vary with the type of system, the objective of the analysis, the analysis steps and the available information. No all-20 encompassing method exists, but rather an interplay of methods is necessary to provide trustworthy information about vulnerabilities within and among critical infrastructures (CIs), including the effect of (inter)dependencies (Kröger and Zio, 2011) . Methods used for vulnerability and risk assessment of infrastructure include susceptibility functions, economic theory based approaches, probabilistic modelling, statistical analyses of past events, empirical approaches, risk analysis of technological systems, network based approaches, agent based approaches, system dynamics based approaches, relational 25 databases and use of vulnerability and risk indices. Meyer et al. (2013) give a broad review of assessment of costs of natural hazards (considering both direct and indirect costs). Yusta et al. (2011 ), Kröger and Zio (2011 ) and Ouyang (2014 provide extensive reviews of vulnerability and risk assessment of infrastructure. Solano (2010) reviews and evaluates methodologies to assess vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures across a number of characteristics. Rinaldi et al. (2001) provide an overview of how to identify, understand and analyse interdependencies between infrastructures. 30
In the following, special attention is given to methods that apply vulnerability and risk indices or identify factors relevant for vulnerability and risk for infrastructures affected by adverse weather and natural hazards, in particular those of Federal Ministry Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess-2016 Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess- -89, 2016 Manuscript under review for journal Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. developed a methodology that identifies adverse events as well as risk and vulnerability factors which may affect the likelihood and consequences of undesirable events. Kröger (2008) discusses the most significant factors related to the risks faced by critical infrastructures. These include societal, system-related, technological, institutional and natural factors, with a special focus on issues associated with the increasing interdependence between infrastructures. The indicators in the abovementioned literature, identified as the most important for the scope of this paper, are summarized below: 10 Dependencies: Dependencies of other infrastructures, specific personnel and specific environmental conditions to work makes the infrastructure more vulnerable; Federal Ministry of the Interior (2008), Vatn et al. (2009 ), Lenz (2009 ) and Kröger (2008 .
Robustness:
The physical robustness of risk elements (in particular facilities, equipment, buildings) is an important factor for whether they will be damaged by an extreme incident; Federal Ministry of the Interior (2008) 
Quality in operational procedures:
The vulnerability of the infrastructure depends on how well it is operated; Vatn (2009); Kröger (2008) .
Transparency/complexity/degree of coupling: The complexity of the infrastructure and its dependency on single 25 components to work contributes to higher vulnerability; Perrow (1984) Preparedness: An outage of an infrastructure is easier and more quickly restored or better handled if the situation has been prepared for; Lenz (2009 ), Vatn (2009 ), Merz (2010 Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess-2016 Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess- -89, 2016 Manuscript under review for journal Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. 
Cascading effects and dependencies:
The definition and content of the term cascading effects are discussed by Pescaroli and Alexander (2015) and in short referred to as "chain-sequence of interconnected failures" or as second-order/higher order effects; (Rinaldi et al.; 2001) . Cascading effects and dependencies of other societal functions on the infrastructure increase the 5 consequences of the infrastructure loss; Vatn (2009) 
Methodology
The method prescribes a three level analysis with an increasing degree of detailing and quantification:
• Level 1: Qualitative: risk identification • Adaptability and quality in operational procedures
• Transparency/complexity/degree of coupling The number of indicators were reduced compared to the indicators listed in the background section: Robustness and buffer capacity were combined since they are closely related; but with the difference being that buffer capacity also deals with the temporal aspect. Furthermore, adaptability and quality of operational procedures were merged into one indicator. Adaptability 30 is related both to the adaptations that are physically possible, but also to the quality and timing of the practical implementation of adaptation. Adaptability therefore also depends on how the infrastructure is operated. Grothmann et al. (2013) 
discuss and
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess-2016 Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess- -89, 2016 Manuscript under review for journal Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. compare frameworks for adaptive capacity for institutions. The indicators for dependencies on external factors for the infrastructure to work would typically also be among the physical vulnerability indicators. These are however omitted here, as they are considered less relevant for loss of infrastructure caused directly be natural events, and thus outside the scope of this method. (The method does not consider infrastructure outages caused by loss of other infrastructures or by lack of resources.)
The chosen indicators for the societal vulnerability in this study thus include the following: 5
• Redundancy/substitutes
• Cascading effects and dependencies
• Preparedness
• Early warning, emergency response and measures
10
The duration of the infrastructure malfunction is included quantitatively in the consequence assessment, see Figure 2 and Table   3 . Thus, the indicator "Restoration effort/duration" is omitted here to prevent it from being taken into account twice in the risk assessment. Figure 2 illustrates the decomposition of the risk and the grouping of the indicators based on their relevance for the frequency of the infrastructure malfunctioning (caused by natural events) and the corresponding societal consequences.
The Figure also illustrates the content of the explicit proposed method for semi-quantitative risk assessment. The next 15 subsection presents a more detailed description of the analysis steps of that method.
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Methodology for semi-quantitative risk assessment (level 2 analysis) 5
The method propose to perform the semi-quantitative risk assessment in three steps:
Step 1: Initial categorisation of the probability and consequence of the top event (natural hazards causing malfunctioning of the infrastructure).
Step 2: Vulnerability assessment: Ranking of the vulnerability indicators, estimation of the physical and societal vulnerability scores. 10
Step 3: Final categorization of probability and consequence, based on the initial categorization and results from the vulnerability assessment Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess-2016 Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess- -89, 2016 Manuscript under review for journal Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Published: 11 April 2016 c Author(s) 2016. CC-BY 3.0 License.
The content of each of the steps will be outlined in the following.
Step 1: Initial categorization of probability and consequence of the top event (natural hazards causing malfunctioning of the infrastructure)
In the initial probability classification, the analyst need to assign the probability of the natural event into one of five 5 quantitatively defined probability categories. The categories range from an annual probability lower than 0,1% (probability category A) to an annual probability higher than 10% (probability category E). Table 2 shows the scheme for the categorization into categories A -E. These probability categories correspond to the categories suggested in DSB (2014).
In the initial consequence categorization, the analyst needs to assign the consequences to one of five consequence classes. In this step, the consequences are determined by the combination of duration of the infrastructure malfunctioning and the numbers 10 of users served by the infrastructure. The lowest consequence category (consequence category 1) corresponds to relatively few users combined with short duration, while the highest consequence category (consequence category 5) corresponds to relatively many users combined with a long duration of malfunction. Table 3 shows the scheme for the categorization of consequence into consequence categories 1-5.
Step 2 a score value on the scale 1 -5, where 1 implies low vulnerability and 5 implies high vulnerability. Next it is beneficial, both for the sake of simplicity and in order to formulate user-friendly explicit procedures, to estimate one aggregated physical vulnerability score and one aggregated societal vulnerability score. There are different ways of performing such a combination.
Approaches for combining the indicators may be to e.g. estimate arithmetical or geometric averages, to perform a fuzzy set analysis or to apply a multi criteria decision approach. In this paper it is chosen to aggregate the indicator scores into a physical 25 vulnerability score estimated as a weighted average of the individual score of the physical vulnerability indicators and a societal vulnerability score estimated as a weighted average of the individual score of the societal vulnerability indicators. The weights will vary with the scale, type and importance of the infrastructure in study and are to be chosen by the user of the method. The flexibility to adjust the weights, combined with the generic formulation of the indicators, make the method suitable to different types of infrastructures and different types of natural events. All the steps of the procedure are implemented into an Excel-30 format work sheet to provide a simple and user-friendly tool for the risk assessment. a) Physical vulnerability assessment: To begin with, score values 1-5 need to be assigned to each of the physical vulnerability indicators. A choice of score value 1 implies that the analysed infrastructure has an optimal realization with respect to the analysed indicator, which means that the physical vulnerability of the infrastructure is low with Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess-2016 Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess- -89, 2016 Manuscript under review for journal Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Published: 11 April 2016 c Author(s) 2016. CC-BY 3.0 License. respect to the indicator. Optimal realizations of indicators imply properties of the infrastructure such as a high robustness and high buffer capacity, high level of protection against the analysed natural event, high quality level, new or very well maintained infrastructure, a high degree of adaptability and quality in operational procedures, a high degree of transparency and that the infrastructure system is has a manageable degree of complexity and coupling.
Score value 5 implies the analysed infrastructure has a severe weakness with respect to the analysed indicator, which 5 means that the indicator contributes to a high physical vulnerability. The criteria chosen to describe the physical vulnerability for each indicator are outlined in Table 4 . After the scoring of the indicators, the physical vulnerability score is estimated as described above. b) Societal vulnerability assessment: Initially, the score values 1-5 need to be assigned to each of the societal 10 vulnerability indicators. A choice of score value 1 implies that the society has an optimized solution with respect to the analysed indicator and infrastructure, contributing to lower societal vulnerability. This is the case if the society have parallel systems to the infrastructure or substitutes that could offer the same services as the analysed infrastructure, if the infrastructure is less important for the society and the malfunctioning is not associated with potential cascading effects and that there are routines for preparedness and emergency response to mitigate the 15 consequences. Score value 5 implies that the society is especially vulnerable to malfunctioning of the infrastructure, with respect to the analysed indicator, i.e. the indicator contributes to a higher societal vulnerability. The criteria chosen to describe the societal vulnerability for each indicator are outlined in the scheme in Table 5 . After the scoring of the indicators, the societal vulnerability score is estimated as described above.
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Step 3: Final categorization of probability and consequence, based on the initial categorization and results from the vulnerability assessment:
The physical vulnerability score is used to adjust the probability category assessed in the initial categorization and the societal vulnerability score is used to adjust the consequence category assessed in the initial categorization, as described below. 25 a) Adjustment of probability category: The physical vulnerability score is seen as a proxy for the probability of a breakdown in the infrastructure, assuming that the natural event in the study has occurred. Thus, low physical vulnerability means that the probability that the infrastructure will break down (due to the natural event) is assumed to be much lower than the frequency for the natural event (for instance one order of magnitude). On the other opposite, if the physical vulnerability is very high, the probability that the natural event will cause infrastructure malfunctioning is 30 also very high. The the probability that the infrastructure will break down (due to the natural event) is similar to the natural event. This conditional probability is accounted for by adjusting the probability category chosen in the initial categorization. The physical vulnerability score is applied to adjust the probability category according to suggested criteria shown in Table 6 . However, judgment should be used when applying these criteria, taking into account, e.g. Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess-2016 Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess- -89, 2016 Manuscript under review for journal Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Published: 11 April 2016 c Author(s) 2016. CC-BY 3.0 License.
whether the probability of the natural event belongs to the lower range within the category or to a higher range. In addition, whether one of the vulnerability indicatorsis considered as having higher importance than the others in the analysed case. b) Adjustment of the consequence category: The societal vulnerability score is a measure of the ability of the society to keep up its functions without the specific infrastructure. If the societal vulnerability is very low, the society is able to 5 keep up its functions despite the malfunctioning infrastructure, thus the initial consequence category could be an overestimation of the consequences. Accordingly, the final consequence category should be adjusted down from the initial consequence category. If the societal vulnerability score is high, the number of affected people can exceed the number of infrastructure users and the final consequence category could be higher than the initial one. The societal vulnerability score is applied to adjust the consequence category according to the suggested criteria in Table 7 . 10
When all the steps are performed, each analysed scenario is assigned a probability category (A-E) and a consequence category (1-5). The risk level is determined by the combination of these, subdivided into 7 risk levels as shown in Table   10 .
Application examples for the municipalities Stryn and Hornindal

15
Figure 3 The Stryn and Hornindal municipalities, Western Norway
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Results 5
The method was applied for the 7 scenarios listed above. The ranking of the vulnerability indicators for each of the scenarios are presented in Table 8 . The initial and final categorization of probability and consequence, as well as the basis for the categorization (i.e. the frequency of the natural event, the duration and number of people served by the infrastructure) are shown in Table 9 . Explanation to and reasoning for the ranking is given in Appendix A. The method has been implemented in an Excel sheet in which the ranking, weighting and calculations have been performed. 10
The results of the analyses are placed in a matrix with increasing severity of consequence along the first axis and increasing probability along the second axis. The corresponding risk level is determined by location in the matrix, subdividing the risk into 7 risk levels illustrated with colour codes. In this way the risk associated with each of the scenarios could easily be compared and the most critical scenarios identified. The risk matrix with the results of the analyses for the 7 scenarios are 15 shown in Table 10 . Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess-2016 Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess- -89, 2016 Manuscript under review for journal Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Published: 11 April 2016 c Author(s) 2016. CC-BY 3.0 License.
As Table 10 shows, the ranking of the risk associated with the analysed scenarios is as follows: None of the analysed scenarios ended up being low risk scenarios. This is not a coincident, as the selected scenarios are based on generic scenarios identified in Stryn og Hornindal kommuner (2014) where considered plausible scenarios posing risk to 10 the municipalities were selected. In addition, in order to facilitate the data collection for the site specific scenarios, scenarios that had already occurred were applied to demonstrate the application of the model.
The results of the analyses provide a better overview over the relevant risks and vulnerabilities and contribute to an increased consciousness in the municipalities. Knowledge about risk and vulnerability associated with the identified scenarios is an important first step to reduce the risk, risk reduction is especially important for the scenarios with the highest risk, e.g. at risk 15 level 6 and risk level 7. All the three scenarios with landslide or avalanche across roads emerge as the most critical scenarios, in addition to the failure in electricity and communication caused by storms. The risk could either be reduced by reducing the probability of the scenario (e.g. through implementation of physical mitigation measures for landslides on the most exposed parts of the road) or to reduce the associated consequences (e.g. through an improvement of the societal vulnerability indicators, such as establishing redundant infrastructure systems). By systematic work with municipal risk analyses followed by 20 associated risk management actions and repeated over time, the municipality can move step by step towards increased safety and stability for the inhabitants.
Discussion
The focus of the method described in Section 4 is to propose a tool for screening of the potential scenarios in an explicit, systematic, transparent and repeatable way that could be applied at the intermediate level in the three level approach. It is a 25 complicated and labour intensive task to analyse the risk associated with infrastructure systems and we see the three level strategy as a practical approach to target the scope of the risk assessment and minimise the analysis effort. The proposed method serves as an alternative to other risk assessment methods with low to intermediate precision and resolution. It provides more guidance to the user than general risk assessment methods and could therefore be used also by non-experts on risk assessment, for example by stakeholders in Norwegian municipalities. The method guides the user in a systematic way through 30 the risk assessment of infrastructure affected by natural events with related consequences for the society. The guidance is provided through vulnerability indicators in terms of the vulnerability of the infrastructure itself and its importance in society.
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess-2016 Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess- -89, 2016 Manuscript under review for journal Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Application of the method assigns a relative risk level to each of the scenarios, where risk level 1 implies the lowest risk and risk level 7 the highest risk. The method produces results that are easy to communicate and provides a good communication tool. The indicator-based approach for the vulnerability assessment enables a combination of different types of data from different sources and knowledge domains and on different formats. The method does not require a large amount of data, but does require that the user has comprehensive knowledge about the local conditions, properties of the infrastructure, how the 5 infrastructure is operated, is aware of the hazard situation in the area with respect to natural events and is capable of assessing the frequency of the hazard and the importance of the various vulnerability factors for the infrastructure being studied. The initial categorization of probability and consequence governs the outcome of the risk analysis, which is dependent on the background knowledge of the user.
10
The proposed method provides, in addition to the risk ranking, implicit guidance on how to reduce the vulnerability (through the information in each of the indicators), and consequently also the risk. The methodology is comprehensive, yet fast, and is designed to be consistent with, and a supplement to, the guidelines for municipal risk and vulnerability analysis in Norway, provided by the Norwegian directorate for Civil Protection, DSB (2014). The proposed method aims to be applicable within the main infrastructures (electricity supply, water supply, transportation, and ICT) and to provide support for mapping of 15 threats from natural events, for planning and preparedness and for prioritization of risk reduction measures.
It should be noted, however, that the accuracy of the method is lower than for a purely quantitative assessment and could not be immediately used for cost-benefit analyses of mitigation strategies. Ideally, the method should be calibrated against quantitative data. This could partly be done for the probability of infrastructure malfunctioning by using historical data from infrastructure operators on infrastructure malfunctioning combined with the properties of the infrastructure. For the societal 20 factors, however, a calibration is more difficult as the societal ability to cope without the analysed infrastructure is not an observable quantity (or could be linked to other observable quantities) that could be relevant to compare with.
Conclusions
This paper shows the development and demonstration of a method for screening of scenarios posing potential high risk in 25 terms of stability for the local society in accordance with the Norwegian guidelines. The method is intended to be the second level of a three-stage methodology for risk assessments, where level 1 consists of risk identification and level 3 consists of detailed quantitative analysis. While the proposed methodology could be applied for all types of natural events and all types of infrastructures, level 3 analyses will to a larger extent need to be adapted to the types of the specific infrastructures and hazards. The analysis may be part of a municipal risk and vulnerability analysis. It can be used on different scales by adapting 30 the consequence categories and can be adapted to different infrastructures through the flexible weighting system. Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess-2016 Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess- -89, 2016 Manuscript under review for journal Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. The indicator approach and less ambiguous ranking criteria for the physical as well as the societal indicators make the model easy to use for people knowledgeable of the municipality and its infrastructures. The proposed method is seen as a useful screening tool for identification of the most critical scenarios and produce results that are easy to understand and to communicate.
Assessment of potential threats and their related risks, including identification of the most critical scenarios, is essential to set 5 priorities for infrastructure protection. The risk assessment contribute to targeted investment in planning and design and facilitate preparedness actions in the event of failure.
Appendix A
The description of the assessment of each scenario as well as explanation of the ranking is given in the following subchapters.
Some of the identified scenarios are scenarios that have already occurred and are expected to occur again. Other scenarios 10 have not occurred, but were considered plausible. For the already occurred scenarios, observations and newspaper reports were used as data sources to support the ranking of the indicators.
Scenario 1: Snow avalanche against main road RV 15 at Strynefjellet
The ranking of this scenario is based on Kristensen (2005) , observations from the area, records of previous events and expert judgment. Selected ranking score for each of the scenarios are given in parentheses. 15
Probability:
• Frequency of natural hazard: Every 5 years, i.e. 0.2 per year for the largest snow avalanche. This corresponds to the probability category "E" in Table 2 .
Vulnerability assessment:
• Robustness and buffer capacity: The road will be closed in case of high avalanche danger. (4) 20
• Level of protection: Some parts of the road are especially exposed to snow avalanches because of the lack of any physical protection (5) • Quality level/Age/Level of maintenance and renewal: The road is relatively old, but is satisfactorily maintained (3)
• Adaptability and quality in operational procedures: The infrastructure is operated by an experienced operator (2) • Transparency/complexity/degree of coupling: Relatively low degree of complexity and coupling. (2) 25 Societal consequences:
• Number of infrastructure users: The annual daily traffic (ADT): 800
• Duration: Good routines for clearing of the road. Large avalanche: duration 2 days, small avalanches: duration 8 hours. The duration can be longer if the road is closed because of avalanche danger or in combination with adverse weather. 30
The abovementioned combination of users and duration qualify for consequence category 3-4 according to Table 3 . Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess-2016 Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess- -89, 2016 Manuscript under review for journal Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Published: 11 April 2016 c Author(s) 2016. CC-BY 3.0 License.
• Redundancy/substitutes: Alternative roads offer long diversions on partly avalanche exposed roads. (4) • Cascading effects and dependencies: Moderate cascading effects, mainly economic consequences as there is a high proportion of utility transportation on the road. (3) • Preparedness: Very high risk awareness and high level of preparedness. (1) • Early warning, emergency response and measures: Early warning and closure of the road can act as a measure to 5 save human lives, but does not prevent the economic consequences of the road closure. (5)
Scenario 2: Debris flow against Innvik waterworks
The ranking is based on a similar historic event in 2014; information given on the homepage of the municipality http://innvik.vikanenett.no/, in the reports from DSB (2015) and Stryn og Hornindal kommuner (2014). Selected ranking score for each of the scenarios are given in parentheses. 10
• Frequency of natural hazard: Once per 10 -50 years, i.e. probability category D according to Table 2. Vulnerability assessment:
• Robustness and buffer capacity: The waterworks can withstand moderate intensities of debris flows (3) 15
• Level of protection: Partially protected from debris flows (3)
• Quality level/Age/Level of maintenance and renewal: Medium age, satisfactory renewal and maintenance (3)
• Adaptability and quality in operational procedures: Operated by an experienced operator, ability to adapt to changing framing conditions (2) • Transparency/complexity/degree of coupling: System with large complexity and many interdependencies (4) 20 Societal consequences:
• Number of infrastructure users: 250
The abovementioned combination of users and duration qualify for consequence category 4 according to Table 3 . 25
• Redundancy/substitutes: Water can be delivered with tank lorry, but at some point after the event the water needs to be boiled to obtain drinking water quality (3)
• Cascading effects and dependencies: Moderate cascading effects. (3) • Preparedness: Some risk awareness, simple emergency response plans. (3) • Early warning, emergency response and measures: Limited possibilities for warning (3) 30 Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess-2016 Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess- -89, 2016 Manuscript under review for journal Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Published: 11 April 2016 c Author(s) 2016. CC-BY 3.0 License.
Scenario 3: Snow avalanche against main road 724 to Oldedalen
The ranking is based on a similar historic events. Selected ranking score for each of the scenarios are given in parentheses.
Probability
• Frequency of natural hazard: More often than once every 10 years, i.e. probability category E according to Table 2 . 5
• Robustness and buffer capacity: The road will be closed in case of in case of high avalanche danger. (4) • Level of protection: Only partial physical protection against snow avalanches (5) • Quality level/Age/Level of maintenance and renewal: The road has a relative high age, but is satisfactorily maintained (3) 10 • Adaptability and quality in operational procedures: Infrastructure is operated by an experienced operator (2) • Transparency/complexity/degree of coupling: Low degree of coupling. (2) Societal consequences:
• Number of infrastructure users: 100 15
The abovementioned combination of users and duration qualify for consequence category 2 according to Table 3 .
• Redundancy/substitutes: No alternative roads to Oldedalen (5)
• Cascading effects and dependencies: Moderate cascading effects, would affect utility transportation of the Olden mineral water producer (3) 20
• Preparedness: High risk awareness and preparedness regarding snow avalanches (2) • Early warning, emergency response and measures: Limited possibilities and risk reducing effects of warning (3)
Scenario 4: Storm leading to failure in electricity distribution and communication to the municipal centre
The ranking is partly based on a similar historic event in December 2011. The selected ranking score for each of the scenarios are given in parentheses. 25
Probability
• Frequency of natural hazard: Severe storms more than once every 10 years. Consideration of historic frequency of storms and an increase in frequency due to climate change suggests a probability category E in Table 2 .
Vulnerability assessment: 30
• Robustness and buffer capacity: Electricity network could withstand storms for some time (3) • Level of protection: Partially protected and well adapted to current climate, but not to future climate (3) Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess-2016 Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess- -89, 2016 Manuscript under review for journal Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Published: 11 April 2016 c Author(s) 2016. CC-BY 3.0 License.
• Quality level/Age/Level of maintenance and renewal: increasing age of the components in the electricity network in Norway in general, (Fridheim et al. 2009 ) (3) • Adaptability and quality in operational procedures: Some ability to adapt to changing framing conditions (3)
• Transparency/complexity/degree of coupling: Low degree of coupling (2) 5 Societal consequences:
• Number of infrastructure users: Population in Stryn municipal centre are 2 372, a large number of these could potentially be affected.
• Duration: 2-7 days
The abovementioned combination of users and duration qualify for consequence category 5 according to Table 3 . 10
• Redundancy/substitutes: There exist alternative energy distribution e.g. for critical care facilities, but not for the whole municipality (4)
• Cascading effects and dependencies: Considerable importance for societal function (4)
• Preparedness: Some risk awareness and preparedness regarding storms. (3)
• Early warning, emergency response and measures: Storms could be warned, but mitigation actions could potentially 15 only have a small reduction effect on the consequences (3)
Scenario 5: Landslide against main road E39 at Skredestranda
The ranking is based on previous historic events, e.g. in November 2015. Selected ranking score for each of the scenarios are given in parentheses.
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• Frequency of natural hazard: More often than once every 10 years, probability category E according to Table 2 . (This scenario occurred twice in 2015).
Vulnerability assessment:
• Robustness and buffer capacity: The road will be closed in case of a landslide of the considered size. (4) 25 • Level of protection: To a large extent exposed to the event (4)
• Quality level/Age/Level of maintenance and renewal: Well-maintained road (2)
• Adaptability and quality in operational procedures: Some ability to adapt to changing framing conditions (3)
• Transparency/complexity/degree of coupling: Low degree of coupling (2) 30 Societal consequences:
• Number of infrastructure users: >1000 Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess-2016 Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess- -89, 2016 Manuscript under review for journal Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Published: 11 April 2016 c Author(s) 2016. CC-BY 3.0 License.
The abovementioned combination of users and duration qualify for consequence category 5 according to Table 3 .
• Redundancy/substitutes: Alternative roads imply major delays (4) • Cascading effects and dependencies: Moderate importance for societal functions (3)
• Preparedness: High risk awareness and preparedness regarding snow avalanches (2) The ranking is partly based on similar historical events. Selected ranking score for each of the scenarios are given in parentheses.
10
• Frequency of natural hazard: Every 10 -50 years, i.e. probability category D according to Table 2 .
• Robustness and buffer capacity: Quite robust, could withstand the event for some time (2) • Level of protection: Partially protected (3) 15
• Quality level/Age/Level of maintenance and renewal: Well-maintained (2)
• Adaptability and quality in operational procedures: Experienced operator, ability to adapt to changing framing conditions (2)
• Transparency/complexity/degree of coupling: Low degree of coupling (2) 20 Societal consequences:
• Number of infrastructure users: 800
The abovementioned combination of users and duration qualify for consequence category 4 according to Table 3 .
• Redundancy/substitutes: Alternatives which imply disadvantages (3) 25
• Cascading effects and dependencies: Moderate cascading effects (3)
• Preparedness: Some risk awareness (3)
• Early warning, emergency response and measures: Routines for warning and implementation of measures exist (2)
Scenario 7: Storm leading to closure of the ferry service between Anda and Lote
The ranking is based on previous occurrence of this scenario and on information from Stryn og Hornindal kommuner (2014) . 30
Selected ranking score for each of the scenarios are given in parentheses.
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess-2016 Discuss., doi:10.5194/nhess- -89, 2016 Manuscript under review for journal Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Published: 11 April 2016 c Author(s) 2016. CC-BY 3.0 License.
Probability:
• Frequency of natural hazard: More than once every 10 th year, probability category E according to Table 2 .
• Robustness and buffer capacity: The ferries can operate in strong winds and relatively high waves (3) 5
• Level of protection: To some extent exposed, but well adapted to current climate (3)
• Quality level/Age/Level of maintenance and renewal: Well-maintained (2) • Adaptability and quality in operational procedures: Experienced operator, some ability to adapt to changing framing conditions (3)
• Transparency/complexity/degree of coupling: Low degree of coupling (2) 10 Societal consequences:
• Number of infrastructure users: 100
The abovementioned combination of users and duration qualify for consequence category 2 according to Table 3 . 15
• Redundancy/substitutes: Travelers can use alternative roads with small delays (2)
• Preparedness: Emergency response plans are available (3)
• Early warning, emergency response and measures: Routines for warning and implementation of measures to limit the consequences exist (2) 20
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4
The infrastructure could only withstand the natural event if the intensity is low and the duration is short.
5
The infrastructure is fragile to the natural event.
Level of protection (including physical mitigation measures and exposure) 1
Infrastructure is not exposed to, or well protected from, the natural event. It is well adapted both to current and future climate. The system is not dependent on the exposed part of the infrastructure to work and is to a low extent dependent on single components to work.
2
The exposed component interacts with a few other components with a low degree of coupling 3
The exposed component interacts with many components and the system has a high degree of coupling 4 The exposed component is part of a system with a high degree of complexity 5 The exposed part of the infrastructure is a component in a system with a high degree of complexity and tight coupling The event is usually predictable in time for early warning. There exists routines for warning and implementation of measures to limit the consequences of the natural event.
3
The natural event can potentially be predicted, but the routines for warning are insufficient, the warning time is short or mitigation action could potentially only have a small reduction effect on the consequences.
4
Low predictability and very short warning time or mitigation action could potentially only have a minor reduction effect on the consequences.
5
It is not possible to predict the natural event or there exist no known mitigation measures to limit the consequences. Table 6 Indicative criteria for determining the probability category using vulnerability indicators and adaptation of initial categorization to final categorization Physical vulnerability score Adjustment of probability category
Low (e.g. < 2) The final probability category is two categories lower than the initial one Medium (e.g. 2-3.5) The final probability category is one categories lower than the initial one High (e.g. > 3.5) The final probability category is equal to the initial one Table 8 and criteria in Table 8 and criteria in Table 7.   3  4  3  5  5  3  2 (i) This probability category was not adjusted downwards even if the physical vulnerability score would indicate that. The reason is that the actual landslide probability is much higher than the lower limit of the probability category.
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